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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STATE JURY SELECTION
PROCEDURE HELD A VIOLATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Criminal defendants have frequently raised due process and equal
protection objections to the exclusion from their state court juries
of various racial, economic, and occupational groups. In Labat v.
Bennett, the Fifth Circuit, in order to determine the validity of
such exclusions, enunciated a constitutional test: whether the ex-
clusion is related to juror competence; whether it is justfied by
public necessity; and whether the exclusion is compatible with
the attainment of a jury which represents a cross section of the
community.
ALTHOUGH the states are not constitutionally required to provide
jury trials in criminal cases,1 nevertheless when a jury is utilized, the
fourteenth amendment directs that it be fairly and impartially con-
stituted. 2 Consistent with this command, the state may exercise
considerable discretion in the formulation of its jury selection pro-
cedures.3 The selection practices of many states may be seriously
challenged, however, in light of Labat v. Bennett,4 in which the Court
1 The jury trial provisions of the sixth amendment have been held inapplicable to
the states. See Fay v. New York, 32 U.S. 261, 288 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 802
U.S. 319, 324 (1937) (dictum); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1899). Because the states
at the present time widely prescribe criminal jury trials, the possibility that the relevant
portion of the sixth amendment will be incorporated into the fourteenth appears to be
remote. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 US. 717, 721-22 (1961), citing COLUMBIA UNIVEaSITY
LEGISLATIVE DRAFTINg RESEARCH FUND, INDEX DIGEsr OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 579 (1959).
2 Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication, 66 YALE L.J. 319,
346 (1957); Scott, The Supreme Court's Control Over State and Federal Criminal
Juries, 34 IowA L. REv. 577, 579, 581 (1949).
8 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 471 (1953); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 271, 291
(1947). See Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638, 640 (1906); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162
U.S. 565, 580 (1896); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 386 (1880).
4 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3353, 3355 (U.S. Apr. 10,
1967, No. 956). Labat is the last of a series of seven cases in which the Fifth Circuit en
banc undertook to settle a number of recurring issues in the jury selection process.
365 F.2d at 711. The other cases were Scott v. Walker, 358 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1966)
(racial discrimination in state court criminal petit jury selection); Billingsley v. Clayton,
359 F.2d 13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 841 (1966) (action to enjoin alleged racial
discrimination by state in selection of venire); Davis v. Davis, 361 F.2d 770 (5th Cir.
1966) (racial discrimination in state court grand and petit criminal jury selection);
Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966) (racial discrimination in federal
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of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that jury selection in Orleans
Parish, Louisiana, was characterized by racial discrimination and
that, on the facts presented, the exclusion of daily wage earners
from petit jury venires produced an unconstitutional deprivation of
an impartial jury representing a cross section of the community.
The two Negro petitioners were convicted of rape by an all-white
jury in 1953. In 1960 the United States Supreme Court remanded a
habeas corpus proceeding to the federal district court5 for disposition
of the petitioners' claim that Negroes had been systematically and
intentionally excluded from the petit jury venire from which their
jury had been drawn.6 Testimony in the district court indicated that
names of prospective jurors were chosen from the city directory by a
three-member, all-white jury commission." Because their experience
had indicated that daily wage earners usually requested to be excused
from jury duty on grounds of hardship, 9 the commissioners by-passed
all known members of this class. The individuals chosen were exam-
ined and any daily wage earners who happened to be called and who
made some showing of hardship were generally excused. The names
of the selected prospects were then placed in a card file, from which
750 names were chosen by the commissioners for the jury wheel. A
grand jury venire was chosen twice yearly from the wheel; and from
the remaining names, a proposed petit jury venire of 150 was drawn
at random, one such venire for each section of the criminal district
jury selection); Jackson v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966) (same); Brooks v.
Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966) (purposeful inclusion of Negroes on state grand jury).
The petitioners' original convictions were affirmed by the Supreme Court, Michel
v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955), rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 955 (1956), on the grounds
that they had waived their right to challenge the grand jury composition by failing
to make a timely objection thereto. The Court later granted certiorari, United States
ex rel. Poret v. Sigler, 361 U.S. 375 (1960), and remanded the case to the district court
to ascertain whether there had been discrimination in petit jury selection. Implicit in
the Supreme Court's remand was a finding that waiver of objections to the grand jury
did not preclude a complaint addressed to the composition of the petit jury.
6 The Louisiana statute regulating juror exemptions does not excuse Negroes.
LA. Itav. STAT. § 15:174 (1950). Furthermore, the statute on juror qualifications spe-
cifically proscribes distinctions based upon race or color. LA. Rav. STAT. § 15:172
(1950). Petitioners alleged that discrimination against Negroes resulted from the manner
in which the selection system was administered. Brief for Petitioners, p. 2, Labat v.
Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966). See note 36 infra.
7 Chosen describes selection of particular individuals to serve on juries, as opposed
to drawing or other random designation.
8 United States ex rel. Poret v. Sigler, 234 F. Supp. 171 (E.D. La. 1964).
* Since Orleans Parish does not pay its jurors, the burdens of jury service were
deemed especially onerous for daily wage earners whose pay was docked during. absence
from work. 365 F.2d at 715.
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court. From the proposed venire each judge granted further excuses
for hardship and chose a final venire of seventy-five persons, from
which petit juries were drawn at random.10 This process had never
produced a Negro for a criminal petit jury."'
Nevertheless, the district court refused to grant writs of habeas
corpus, finding that the absence of Negroes from petit juries was the
result of the liberal granting of hardship excuses, a procedure in
which racial discrimination was held to play no part. 2 The court of
appeals, however, reversed. The court noted that non-whites com-
posed about thirty-two per cent of the parish population13 and that
the parties had stipulated that ten per cent of the proposed venires
were non-white. 14  Nevertheless, after an independent assessment
of the figures available on the composition of the venires, the court
disregarded the stipulation, favoring use of the statistics concerning
final venires.15 These latter figures indicated that the percentage
of Negroes in the four years immediately preceding petitioners' first
trial was under four per cent'6 and in the four months preceding trial
approximately three per cent.17 Ruling that these statistics presented
a prima facie case of racial discrimination, 8 the court required that
10 For a detailed description of the entire jury selection system, see id. at 713-15.
11 Id. at 716.
12 United States ex rel. Poret v. Sigler, 234 F. Supp. 171, 177 (E.D. La. 1964).
18365 F.2d at 716.
"Ibid.
1 Id. at 716-17. The final venire was the result of the judge's request for volunteers.
See note 17 infra. The fact that final venire figures are chosen to represent the true
proportion of Negroes on venires would indicate that if a volunteer system operates
to eliminate Negroes, such a system will not be upheld regardless of its potential for
fairness. See generally Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, pp. 13-14, Labat v. Bennett,
365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966).
10 The actual figure was 3.7% of the sample studied over the period from January
1948 to March 1953. 365 F.2d at 716-17.
17 The actual figure was 3.1% of the sample studied over the period from November
1952 to March 1953. Ibid. The figures for the commissioners' proposed venires in-
volved a more favorable racial balance. In the years preceding petitioners' trial the
average .proportion of non-whites was 6.2%, the available non-whites composing 25.8%
of the fopulation. In the five months preceding trial, the proposed venire was 4.9%
non-white. Id. at 716. The final venire was composed primarily of volunteers. No
figures were noted on the number of Negroes who volunteered for jury service. Id. at
715; see note 15 supra.
1s Labat's approach to the allocation of the burden of proof, termed the "rule of
exclusion," is designed to spare individual petitioners the hardship of an extensive
analysis of possibly voluminous data on the selection system in the possession of the
state. Petitioners are allowed to make out a prima fade case by showing only
objective results, namely, an absence of Negroes from juries or a disproportionately
small representation of them. See, e.g., Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 402 (1942); Pierre
v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 361-62 (1939); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591 (1935);
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the state provide a constitutionally acceptable explanation for the
absence of Negroes.19 The state's assertion that the absence of
Negroes resulted fortuitously from liberally excusing daily wage
earners was held insufficient to carry its burden of proof on the
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880); Gillespie, The Constitution and the All-
White Jury, 39 Ky. LJ. 65, 77 (1950).
Once a claimant has made out a prima fade case, the burden shifts to the state
to disprove pernicious discrimination. "[Ihe indisputable fact that no Negro had
served on a criminal court grand or petit jury for a period of thirty years created a
very strong showing that during that period Negroes were systematically excluded from
jury service because of race. [This placed] . .. a duty [upon] . . . the State to try to
justify such an exclusion as having been brought about for some reason other than racial
discrimination." Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 466 (1947). Compare Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 205-09 (1965).
The "rule of exclusion" is apparently "available in supplying proof of discrimina-
tion against any delineated class." Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480 (1954)
(Mexican-Americans). (Emphasis added.) However, it appears that this prima facie
test has been applied primarily in cases involving alleged discrimination against groups
traditionally subject to social, political, and legal oppression. Compare Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); with Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), and United States
v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1954). See generally Note, Fair Jury Selection Procedures,
75 YALE L.J. 322, 323-27 (1965).
The proposed Civil Rights Bill of 1966, Title II, § 204 contained provisions for
shifting the burden of proof three times. Upon an allegation of discrimination the
state officials would be required to furnish a detailed description of the selection
system. If the complaining party then introduced evidence of discrimination in support
of the challenge, that party would be given access to state selection records not ordinarily
made public. If the court found probable cause, the state would then have the burden
of disproving the allegations of discrimination. H.R. REP. No. 1678, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
54-57 (1966). See generally Note, The Congress, the Court and Jury Section: A
Critique of Titles I and II of the Civil Rights Bill of 1966, 52 VA. L. REV. 1069 (1966).
29 365 F.2d at 719. The percentage figures in Labat indicate a smaller proportion
of Negro representation than appeared in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965),
wherein the Supreme Court refused to find racial discrimination upon a showing of
disproportionate Negro representation. Id. at 209. In Swain, Negroes composed
about 26% of the population eligible by age for jury service and over a number of
years had actually composed 10-15% of the grand jury panels and petit jury venires,
id. at 205, which are comparable to the grand jury venires and final petit jury venires
in Labat. The 10-15% figure in Swain thus compares to a 3-4% figure in Labat. See
text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
It should be noted that both the concurring and the dissenting judges in Labat
found the majority's statistical analysis to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
determination in Swain. In particular, they felt that "this minimum of ten percent
representation [on the proposed venire] as compared to thirty two per cent Negro popu-
lation does not make out deliberate and intentional limitation or exclusion of Negroes
from jury service." 365 F.2d at 740 (separate opinion of Bell, J.); see id. at 737
(Gewin, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the mere fact that no Negroes had actually
served on juries for many years preceding the trial in question, a crucial factor in the
majority's analysis, was thought not to be determinative of deliberate exclusion under
the Swain approach. Id. at 739-40 (separate opinion of Bell, J.); see Swain v. Alabama,
supra at 205-09. Thus, the Swain decision presented the Labat majority with con-
Eiderable obstacles to circumvent. See 365 F.2d at 712-13; Note, 52 VA. L. REv. 1069.
1070 n.6 (1966).
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alternative grounds that the exemption of daily wage earners was a
subterfuge for deliberate racial discrimination 20 and that the ex-
clusion of the entire daily wage earner class violated petitioners'
rights to due process and equal protection of the laws.21
Due process of law requires, at a minimum, that a criminal de-
fendant's jury be fair and impartial. 22 Thus, it is clear that a state
may not cause a defendant to be tried by demonstrably biased or
incompetent judges or jurors.23 Moreover, in order to diminish the
prejudicial effect of any antipathy existing between various ethnic
and social units from which jurors are drawn, some courts have indi-
cated that jury venires must reasonably represent a cross section of the
community as a condition precedent to the constitution of a truly im-
partial tribunal.24
However, various factors limit a defendant's opportunity to de-
mand the benefits of an absolute cross section, the existence of which
is subject to restrictions imposed by a variety of public, private, and
judicial interests. For example, the public interest may dictate that
certain classes of persons whose work is especially vital to the welfare
of the community should be exempt from jury service.25 Further
20 365 F.2d at 724-25. See notes 51, 53 infra and accompanying text.
21365 F.2d at 719-20. See note 51 infra and accompanying text. Judge Gewin dis-
sented on the theory that petitioners did not adequa'tely prove intentional racial dis-
crimination and that, in the absence of such proof, the percentage figures in Labat,
accepting the 10% Negro representation stipulated, compared favorably with figures
in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1954), wherein the Supreme Court refused to find dis-
crimination in the presence of less favorable figures on Negro representation. 365 F.2d
at 737-38 (Gewin, J., dissenting); see note 19 supra.
Judges Bell and Coleman were agreed that a pattern of racial discrimination had
not been demonstrated. 365 F.2d at 739-40 (separate opinion of Bell, J.); see note 19
supra. However, they concurred in the result on the ground that the exclusion of daily
wage earners as a class deprived petitioners of an impartial jury in violation of due
process and equal protection. 365 F.2d at 740-41.
22 See note 2 supra and accompanying text. ,
"*E.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923);
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (dictum); Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167,
176 (1912).
" See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128,
130 (1940); Allen v. State, 110 Ga. App. 56, 62, 137 S.E.2d 711, 715 (1964).
"The conception of a jury selected without class discrimination is a narrower con-
ception than that of a fair and impartial jury. It is, however, an essential element in
the conception of a fair and impartial jury." Kentucky v. Powers, 139 Fed. 452, 463
(C.C.E.D. Ky. 1905), rev'd on other grounds, 201 U.S. 1 (1906).
See generally Note, The Defendant's Challenge to a Racial Criterion in Jury Selec-
tion: A Stud)y in Standing, Due Process, and Equal Protection, 74 YAi.E L.J. 919, 923
n.29 (1965).
", Tpical exemptions are those of the professional classes, such as doctors and law-
yers. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 39-104 (1947) (exemption of physicians, surgeons, prac-
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limiting the supply of jurors is the practical requirement that the
jury, to function as an evaluative tribunal, should be composed of
competent individuals. 26 In addition, the interests of individuals
selected for jury service may necessitate excusing those for whom
service would be a hardship. 27
Effective benefit of a jury drawn from a representative cross sec-
tion is, however, most severely circumscribed by the requirement that
a defendant have standing to challenge the composition of any par-
ticular jury.28 According to traditional doctrines, a defendant must
demonstrate that an improperly drawn jury actually prejudiced his
position.29  However, obvious difficulties involved in assessing the
ticing attorneys, ministers); CAL. Civ. PRoc. CoDE § 200 (exemption of attorneys, min-
isters, teachers, physicians); S.C. CoDo ANN. § 38-104 (1962) (exemption of registered
practicing optometrists). For additional examples, see note 83 infra. Rarely attacked,
exemptions of this sort have traditionally been held within the states' powers. See,
e.g., Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906) (exclusion of professional classes).
20 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 473 (1953); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 85-86 (1942); Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912) (dictum); Rabinowitz
v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 92 (5th Cir. 1966) (separate opinion of Coleman, J.)
The proposed Civil Rights Bill of 1966 provided literacy requirements for federal
court jurors, viz., that they be able to "read, write, speak, and understand the English
language." H.R. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101-1866 (1966). However, the minimal
nature of these requirements was underscored by former Attorney General Katzenbach in
the following terms: "A person who is able to fill out the form substantially, who stated
on the form that he is able to read, write, speak and understand the English language,
and who satisfies the remaining qualifications [of residency, etc.] must be found
qualified to serve." Statement before Subcommittee 15, House Judiciary Committee,
in support of H.R. 14765, May 4, 1966, p. 9. The prospective juror himself is thus
actively to participate in the determination of his competency for service. See generally
Note, 52 VA. L. Rv. 1069 (1966).
In many states, statutes define competency requirements. E.g., Iowa CODE § 607.1
(1962); Nm. Rxv. STAT. § 25-1601 (1) (1964); N.Y. JuDICIARY LAw 596(b).
27The practice of granting individual excuses is acceptable even in the federal jury
system, e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946), wherein selection and
exclusion are governed by statute, see 28 U.S.C §§ 1861-63 (1964), and a defendant
need not prove prejudice to attack a jury exclusion. See note 51 infra. See also
Blume, Jury Selection Analyzed: Proposed Revision of the Federal System, 42 Mxci. L.
REv. 831 (1944). See generally Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress Over
Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separa-
tion of Powers, 37 HAiv. L. REv. 1010, 1098-1100 (1924).
28 Present Supreme Court standing requirements would preclude an unprejudiced
defendant's attack on jury exclusions even if it were not generally recognized that
states do have power to "edit" jury venires. See, e.g., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261,
291-94 (1947); 60 HA.v. L. R v. 613, 618-19 (1947).
"E.g., Fay v. New York, supra note 28, at 291-94; Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S.
638 (1906); People v. Manuel, 41 Cal. App. 153, 155-56, 182 Pac. 306-07 (Dist. Ct. App.
1919). Contra, Allen v. State, 110 Ga. App. 56, 137 S.E.2d 711 (1964), 78 HA.Rv. L. Av.
667 (1965); State v. Madison, 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965). See Sedler, Standing
to Assert Constitutional ]us Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 636-38,
658-59 (1962).
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social, psychological, and economic data necessary to prove that ex-
cluding a certain group from jury duty results in actual prejudice0
have been mitigated by the "same class" rule, which provides that a
defendant is presumed to have been prejudiced if he is a member of
a class which has traditionally been the subject of discriminatory
practices. 31 As a practical matter, therefore, the operative effect of
the "same class" rule is clearly circumscribed, providing constitutional
protection only where a clear equal protection violation exists.3 2
However, precisely because of the rule's restricted application, it is
inaccurate to speak of the defendant's general due process right to
have his jury selected from a venire representing a cross section of
the community.
In addition to due process considerations, the equal protection
clause has been successfully invoked to secure reversal of convictions
obtained under an allegedly discriminatory jury selection system.3 3
However, it may be noted that the equal protection analysis is prem-
ised on the notion that white defendants will be treated more favor-
ably than Negro defendants by all-white juries.3 4 Singularly absent
30 See Note, 74 YALE L.J. 919, 920-23 (1965).
31 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477-78 (1954); Note, 74 YAL L.J. 919, 920-23
(1965); Scott, supra note 2, at 583-84.
The Supreme Court has never determined the question of standing in relation
to one who is not a member of the excluded class. The Court sidestepped this ques-
tion in Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 287 (1947). See generally Note, 52 VA. L. REv.
1069, 1098 (1966); 78 HARv. L. RZv. 667 (1965).
82 See Note, 74 YALE L.J. 919, 920 (1965).
33 See, e.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475 (1954); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1880).
While there was initially some doubt as to the applicability of the equal protection
clause to equality in jury service, the language of the amendment was later held
broad enough to cover it. See Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segrega-
tion Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1, 58, 64-65 (1955); Frank & Munro, The Original
Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUmn. L. RaV. 131, 145 (1950).
See also Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HA.v. L. REv. 149 (1928). The equal protection clause has been invoked frequently
by Negro defendants alleging the exclusion of Negroes from their juries. See Gillespie,
The Constitution and the All-White Jury, 39 KY. L.J. 65 (1950). See also Schaefer,
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1956).
The equal protection argument is of course available to defendants who are mem-
bers of any class excluded from the jury, which class has traditionally been the subject
of substantial bias or oppression. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, supra (Mexican
descent); Kentucky v. Powers, 139 Fed. 452 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1905) (political party), rev'd
on other grounds, 201 U.S. 1 (1906); State v. Guirlando, 152 La. 570, 93 So. 796 (1922)
(dictum) (Italians); Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 297, 277 S.W. 1091 (1925) (Roman
Catholics).
" See, e.g., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 285 (1947). Compare Cassel v. Texas,
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in the decisions has been that form of equal protection rationale
which requires that there be a reasonable relation between the
classification made and the end to be achieved-the approach which
has traditionally been taken with respect to state police power regu-
lations.35
Within the limited scope of constitutional inquiry the courts have
faced both direct and indirect means of excluding minority groups.3 6
Direct exclusions involve the deliberate omission of the members of
a class for reasons which fail to articulate an objective policy. Effec-
tuation of this manner of exclusion requires a standard for jury
selection sufficiently subjective that the jury commissioners may give
free rein to their personal prejudices.37 Absent an acceptable ex-
389 U.S. 282, 801-02 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Of course, in many circumstances
the defendant may be able to assert both due process and equal protection objections
to the jury selection procedure. Thus, "to the extent that the Negro defendant is
allowed to invoke the due process clause, the premise is that a jury from which
Negroes are intentionally excluded will not give him a fair trial; the alternative
equal protection foundation for reversing such convictions (which is more commonly
encountered in the opinions of the Supreme Court, when one clause is singled out) is
that white defendants will be treated more generously by all-white juries than Negroes,
so that even though the brand of justice meted out to Negroes would be constitu-
tionally unobjectionable if applied to all, a weaker brand is given to Whites." Bittker,
The Case of the Checkerboard Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71 YALE
L.J. 1387, 1406-07 (1962). (Emphasis added.) See Note, 74 YALE L.J. 919, 926-30 (1965).
Results of a recent study show significant differences in the incidence of sympathy
aroused by various categories of criminal defendants. It was concluded that "defendants
under twenty-one have the highest sympathy index (+17), women defendants rank next
(+11), then older defendants (+8), down to Negro defendants who show a negative
sympathy index (-7) indicating that these defendants appear on balance unattractive
to the jury." KALVEN & ZEIsEL, THE AMERICAN JuRY 210 (1966).
83 E.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
For a critique of the chary application of the "reasonable classification" analysis in
the Supreme Court, see Note, 74 YALE L.J. 919, 926-29 (1965). But see Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954); Note, 52 VA. L. Rav. 1069, 1100-01 (1966).
For an inquiry into criteria of reasonableness of state classifications, see Tussman and
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rav. 341, 344-53 (1949). See
generally Bittker, The Case of the Checkerboard Ordinance: An Experiment in Race
Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387 (1962).
8 8 The primary mechanisms available to exclude jurors are statutes and the exercise
of administrative discretion. Statutory exclusion of Negroes on racial grounds was
struck down by the'Supreme Court in 1880 as a violation of equal protection. Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 803 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880). Since
that time, attention has focused on exclusions made in the administration of statutes
fair on their faces. See cases cited note 38 infra.
11 Thus, the most obvious of subjective standards is that which permits jurors to
be chosen rather than randomly drawn. See Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584
(1958); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939). Another system susceptible of
prejudiced application is that which provides an opportunity for administrators to
remove Negroes from a petit jury venire and assign them to a grand jury where a
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planation for the dearth of representatives of the relevant class when
a subjective standard is in operation, the Supreme Court has not been
hesitant to vindicate the rights of affected defendants by overturning
convictions obtained under such systems.38
On the other hand, indirect exclusions involve the omission of
a particular group or class as the result of the application of a
standard which on its face is socially or racially neutral.3 9 Such a
unanimous decision is not required for indictment. E.g., Scott v. Walker, 358 F.2d
561 (5th Cir. 1966).
A direct exclusion may also result from the failure of jury commissioners to
include any Negroes on the venire because they knew of no eligible Negroes, Cassell
v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131-82 (1940); United
States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53, 59-60 (5th Cir. 1962); or from the listing of
Negroes as numbers 13, 14, 15, or 16 for a twelve-man jury, Smith v. Texas, supra at
129.
88 The following cases concern jury selection systems involving "direct" exclusions
which have been invalidated by the Court: Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773
(1964) (per curiam) (white and Negro names separately listed on source list for grand
jury); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 856 U.S. 584 (1958) (instances of choice throughout selec-
tion system); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (commissioners selected those
"best qualified'-exclusion of those of Mexican descent); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S.
559 (1953) (white and Negro names kept separate by use of different-colored tickets);
Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950) (commissioners chose from their personal ac-
quaintances); Hill v. Texas, 816 U.S. 400 (1942) (commissioners investigated no Negro
potential jurors); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (if listed at all, names of Negroes
almost invariably appeared as numbers 13 through 16, for a twelve-juror panel); Pierre
v. Louisiana, 806 U.S. 354 (1939) (choice of jurors); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935) (Negro names designated "col." on jury list); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1880) (commissioners chose "sober and judicious" persons-no Negroes).
There is no need to discuss challenges to the grand and petit jury separately, as
the only difference between them is a practical one: if both the grand and petit juries
are successfully challenged, the indictment will be quashed and the conviction reversed.
E.g., Pierre v. Louisiana, supra at 361. Furthermore, no distinction will be drawn
between total absence of representation and token representation, as such limitation is
likewise unconstitutional. Smith v. Texas, supra at 131-32.
Even while vindicating a defendant's right to a jury drawn without discrimination,
however, the courts have indicated that no member of defendant's race need be present
on his jury, Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203 (1965); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 813
(1879); and that proportional representation of racial, geographic, and occupational
groups is neither required, Swain v. Alabama, supra at 208; Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 471 (1953); Cassell v. Texas, supra at 286-87; Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 291
(1947); Scott v. Walker, 358 F.2d 561, 571 (5th Cir. 1966); United States v. Dennis, 183
F.2d 201, 223 (2d Cir. 1950), af'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); nor allowed, Swain v. Alabama,
supra at 208; Cassell v. Texas, supra at 286-87.
"Arguably, some cases may fall either in the direct or indirect category. Those
cases involve selection criteria which, though capable of impartial application, have a
subjective element which allows discrimination against a minority group in judging such
qualities as intelligence or manner of the prospective juror. Such a system has been
approved even where administrative exclusions were alleged to exclude about 85%
of the manual laborers who survived statutory elimination, though only 33% of the
nonmanual laborers were similarly eliminated. United States v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354, 382-
83 (2d Cir. 1954). But see Hernandez v. Texas, 847 U.S. 475, 480-82 (1954), where the
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standard was before the Supreme Court in Brown v. Allen,40 where
the state sought to select as jurors those individuals "with the most
property."41  The Court, finding no indication of discrimination
based solely on race, approved the results of this system even though
there was evidence that Negroes constituted only seven per cent of the
jury list in a county whose population was thirty-eight per cent
colored.42  Similarly, in Fay v. New York, 43 the Court upheld the
state's application of intelligence, citizenship, and literacy tests to
secure "blue ribbon" panels, notwithstanding evidence of a minimal
two-tenths of one per cent representation of working class people in
a county where this group comprised fifty-seven per cent of the popu-
lation.44
In the foregoing instances, where the application of objective
standards disclosed no obvious opportunity for the operation of in-
tentional discrimination, the Court was quick to accept a rational
explanation for the absence of the classes involved.45  The Court's
restraint was undoubtedly due to some reluctance fully to accept the
premise that a defendant cannot receive a fair trial from a jury
composed of individuals whose backgrounds are different from his
own46 and to its articulated desire to accord states an opportunity to
tailor the jury system to their particular needs.47  As yet, the Su-
commissioners' testimony that they impartially sought competence in jury prospects was
held not sufficient to overcome a prima fade case of discrimination against Mexican-
Americans, who formed 14% of the population, yet had not been represented on a jury
for twenty-five years. These decisions are reconcilable, however, if it is assumed that
the Supreme Court did not find a good faith attempt to select jurors on an impartial
basis in the Hernandez case.
,0 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
,1 Id. at 480.
2 Id. at 481. The racially discriminatory effect of the economic standard, however,
was not developed in the lower courts and not considered by the Supreme Court. Id. at
480, 482.
"332 U.S. 261 (1947).
"Id. at 298 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
"It is notable that, in contrast to Labat, the Court in neither Brown nor Fay
examined the tendered explanations for exclusions in a context independent of race or
class. The Brown Court did note, however, that the petitioner failed to raise an
objection to juror selection on an economic basis. 344 U.S. at 480.
"1 In discussing due process and occupational exclusions, the Court has said: "But
we are not ready to assume that these differences of function [among different occupa-
tions] degenerate into a hostility such that one cannot expect justice at the hands of
occupations and groups other than his own." Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 292
(1947).
'7 "But beyond requiring conformity to standards of fundamental fairness that have
won legal recognition, this Court has always been careful not so to interpret [the
fourteenth] ... Amendment as to impose uniform procedures upon the several states
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preme Court has never struck down a state selection system because
of discrimination resulting from indirect exclusions.
Though requiring defendants to meet a stiff constitutional test
in challenging state juries, the Supreme Court has liberally shaped
federal jury selection policy through the exercise of its supervisory
power.48 In Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co.,49 a civil case, the Court
invalidated the systematic exclusion of daily wage earners on the
ground that the economic status of the excluded jurors had no reason-
able relationship to their capacity as jurors. Although the decision
was based solely upon the supervisory power,5' the Court's analysis
invokes a genre of equal protection argument-whether the classifica-
tion has a reasonable relation to the end in view52-which has been
unavailable to defendants in state jury exclusion cases. 53
In Labat the Fifth Circuit entered the area of indirect, economic
whose legal systems stem from diverse sources of law and reflect different historical
influences." Id. at 294.
"e See id. at 287 (dictum); Ballard v. United States, 529 U.S. 187, 195 (1946); Thiel
v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946); Note, 52 VA. L. R.v. 1069, 1105-19
(1966); cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1942).
"8 328 U.S. 217 (1946), 35 CALIF. L. Rav. 142 (1947), 59 HARV. L. RaV. 1167 (1946).
328 U.S. at 223. The Court's examination of the relationship between the classi-
fication and the ends to be achieved thereby resembles the equal protection analysis
which has been primarily employed in testing police power classifications. See note
85 supra and accompanying text.
An additional requirement in the federal courts is that a jury must be drawn from
a group that represents a community cross section. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 85 (1942). However, some pre-editing has been allowed as an efficiency measure.
Thus, an evaluation of writing ability, appearance, and manner is permitted to avoid
calling those persons who will probably prove unsuitable, provided that whole classes
are not thereby totally excluded or limited to token inclusion. United States v.
Flynn, 216 F.2d 854, 384, 387 (2d Cir. 1954). The Flynn case may be distinguished
from Thiel by noting that, in Thiel, wage earners were excluded before they even
made an appearance. In addition to condemning this advance class rejection, the
Thiel Court added that prospective jurors must be selected without the systematic
exclusion of economic, social, religious, racial, political, and geographical groups of
the community. 828 U.S. at 220.
5rId. at 225; see 59 HARy. L. REv. 1167 (1946). On the issue of standing, the Court
did not require that the defendant in Thiel actually demonstrate that he was prejudiced
by the wrongful exclusion. Because federal statutes govern jury selection in the federal
courts, note 27 supra, improper jury selection alone necessitates a reversal of the
proceeding. Ballard v. Uxiited States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946); Sedler, supra note 29,
at 636-37.
2 See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
"18The Court's usual method of stating the equal protection issue in state jury
exclusion cases has been to inquire whether, as a result of an exclusion, the defendant
received less favorable treatment than that accorded others, not whether the ex-
clusion itself, viewed apart from the defendant challenging it, was reasonably related
to the end of proper jury selection. See, e.g., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 285-86
(1947). See also notes 3-35 supra and accompanying text.
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exclusions in a state selection system and found the practice un-
acceptable for two reasons:
(A) The exclusion of daily wage earners as a class violates the
petitioners' due process and equal protection rights to an impartial
jury representing a cross-section of the community.
(B) The exclusion of this large class, 47 per cent of all Negro
workers in Orleans Parish ...discriminated against Negroes in
violation of the equal protection clause in that the class contains
a disproportionately large number of Negroes. 54
To the extent that the question before the court was whether the
state had intentionally excluded Negroes from its petit jury venires, 55
the court's discussion of the constitutionality of excluding wage
earners could arguably be considered dicta. However, in light of the
court's extensive consideration and novel conclusion regarding the
wage earner exclusion and the fact that there was a greater consensus
on this issue than on proof of invidious racial discrimination, 5 the
invalidation of the economic criterion deserves careful scrutiny.
In exploring the impact of the daily wage earner exclusion on
the cross section obtained, the court cited Thiel as a "strong case
for petitioners" 57 and elevated that holding to one of constitutional
magnitude. Then, in order to determine the reasonableness of the
daily wage earner exclusion in Labat, the court evaluated this ex-
clusion according to a triple test: whether the exclusion was related
" 365 F.2d at 719-20. See notes 19, 41-42 supra and accompanying text.
55 365 F.2d at 701. (Emphasis in original.) The question of intentional racial dis-
crimination was certified to the district court by the Supreme Court. See note 5 supra.
to See note 21 supra and accompanying text. There were adequate grounds for a
finding of intentional exclusion of Negroes. In light of the fact that the commissioners
had taken no remedial action after the earlier Louisiana decision, State v. Anderson,
205 La. 710, 18 So. 2d 33 (1944), in which they were put on notice that their selection
methods would have to be modified to avoid racial discrimination, it is arguable that
they intended the discriminatory result which they knew would follow. Even more
pertinent to the finding that excluding wage earners was merely a subterfuge for racial
discrimination was the fact that subsequent to the petitioners' trial and prior to the
instant case, the jury selection system was invalidated by the Supreme Court in Eubanks
v, Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958). Moreover, the standards used were subjective. See
note 37 supra and accompanying text. Traditionally, a state's disavowals of invidious
discrimination are more closely scrutinized in such circumstances. See note 38 supra
and acompanying text.
11 365 F.2d at 722. The court indicated that earlier cases, including Thiel, while
ostensibly based on the supervisory power, nonetheless spoke so directly to abuse of the
jury system as to justify a finding that the holdings went "beyond the mere application
of supervisory power" and were reminiscent of the invocation of constitutional considera-
tions. Id. at 722 n.40. See note 80 infra.
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to juror competence, 5 whether there was a public need for the un-
interrupted work of the excluded class,59 and whether that class
formed such a large portion of the community that no jury from
which its members were excluded could be truly representative. 00
The facts of Labat made resolution of the case easy since the
wage earner exclusion failed each of the standards. Yet the court's
failure clearly to articulate the significance of the various elements
of the test poses questions as to its application in situations less obvi-
ous than that presented in Labat. Thus, while the court was able to
state categorically that economic status can have no relation to juror
competence, broader and more difficult issues relating to the level of
competence which a state may constitutionally require of its jurors
were left unresolved. Nor did the court investigate the nature of the
public interest which would justify excluding persons on that basis.
Similarly, there was no intimation, except in general terms, of the
extent to which a cross section may be limited before it becomes
constitutionally suspect. 61 Nevertheless, thecourt did intimate that
r8 365 F.2d at 721-23.
59 Id. at 723, 726-27.
0 1Id. at 723. Although the exclusion challenged in Labat was accomplished by
administrative officers and was unauthorized by statute (see note 6 supra), the court's
reliance on the constitutional significance of the exclusion indicates that such exclusion
would be invalid whether administratively or statutorily effected. Consequently, the
.triple test should be viewed as'a standard against which state exemption and exclusion
statutes must be measured, with the concomitant presupposition that if such statutes
do not pass the triple test, they are similarly invalid. In the application of such a
standard the present statutory selection measures of many states will be called into
serious question. See notes 25 supra and 83 infra.
At this point the procedural context in which the triple test comes into play
should be noted briefly. Initially, it is. incumbent upon the party challenging the
selection process to make a prima facie showing of unconstitutional jury exclusions.
This demonstration may indicate that particular classes or groups of the population
have been systematically excluded from jury service. See note 18 supra. The burden
of going forward with the evidence is then on the state to demonstrate a rational
nexus between the exclusion and a legitimate state policy relating to competency
standards or public need criteria. Cf. ibid. Presumably, if the state introduces no
evidence, the attack upon the exclusion will be sustained. In this instance, the matter
is ended without the invocation of the triple test. On the other hand, should the state
attempt to justify the exclusion on the basis of public need or competency, then a bal-
ancing of the three elements of the triple test becomes necessary. In addition to the
public need and competency justifications for the exclusion, the percentage of the
population actually barred, or the cross section function, is a significant element to be
considered.
01 The Labat court disapproved the abridgment of the cross section to the extent
that it involved the exclusion of "47 per cent of all Negro workers in New Orleans,"
365 F.2d at 724 (emphasis added), when it was earlier established that Negroes formed
about 32% of the population of Orleans Parish. Note 13 supra and accompanying
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a fourth grade literacy level was an appropriate standard of com-
petence 2 and that exemptions based on personal hardship should
be limited in light of the solemn public obligation to serve on
juries.6 3  It is unclear, therefore, that the exclusionary schemes in
Brown v. Allen 64 and Fay v. New York65 would have been sustained
under the Fifth Circuit's test.
While the court's statement of the constitutional infirmity in
Labat emphasized the cross section question, 6 nevertheless, to the
extent that a triple test is proposed, the court did not adequately dis-
cuss the interrelationship of the three criteria when some, but not all,
of them are satisfied- in any given case. There are, in fact, eight
.categories into which any exclusionary scheme might fall. The
possibilities may be diagrammed as follows: 67
text. There is, however, no numerical statement of the extent to which the cross
section of Orleans Parish was abridged by the exclusion of Negro workers.
Furthermore, while these figures generally indicate an unconstitutional limitation
of the cross section, the court did not define the minimum ratios which would pass
muster under its test. For a comparison of the statistical circumstances in Labat with
figures approved by the Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), see
note 19 supra.
02 The suggestion of a fourth grade literacy level is implicit in a passage in which
the court states that "certain other statistics have a special relevancy to the number of
Negroes in the parish eligible to serve on juries. . . . In 1950 64 per cent of the
non-white population had more than four years schooling." 365 F.2d at 726. In
addition, the appendix to the majority opinion includes the percentages of whites
and non-whites in Orleans Parish who have at least a fourth grade education. Id.
at 728. Merely including the figures would not seem particularly significant, as the
tables in which they appear were provided by petitioners. Brief for Petitioners, p. 11.
-owever, Judge Bell, concurring, criticized the suggestion implicit in .the reproduction
of these figures. 365 F.2d at 741. Assuming that Judge Bell was familiar with the views
of the other judges in greater depth than they appear in the majority opinion, it is
significant that he stated that they are contemplating "jury service by functionally
illiterate persons." Ibid. This remark suggests that, in his view, the majority have
approved the fourth grade standard for juror qualification.
03 See id. at 727.
6, See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
61 See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
0 The significance of the cross section element of the triple test is indicated by the
court's requirement that the parish jury commissioners actively seek Negroes for their
venires. 365 F.2d at 725. This suggestion is reinforced by Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1
(5th Cir. 1966), in which the court held the purposeful inclusion of Negroes on the
venire to be constitutional. The approval of deliberate inclusion provides striking
contrast to earlier cases which had consistently held that selection procedures should
be "color-blind." E.g., Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945); Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880); see Note, 52 VA. L. Rlv. 1069, 1103 (1966).
67 Although there are technically eight categories, those two which involve schemes
which fail all three standards or which pass all three pose no special problem as to the
result produced by the interaction of the standards.
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CATEGORIES: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0
Competence 0 0 0 0 + + + +
Public Need 0 0 + + 0 0 + +
Cross Section 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 +
O indicates that an exclusion fails the designated test.
+ indicates that an exclusion passes the designated test.
Category one may be illustrated by State v. Madison,8 cited
approvingly in Labat,9 which invalidated'the exclusion of those
who would not state their belief in God. In light of our society's
acceptance of a diversity of philosophies, it could hardly be argued
that lack of belief in God renders one per se incompetent for jury
service. Furthermore, there would appear to be no public need to
exclude such persons to avoid interruption of their work. Neverthe-
less, exclusion of the nonbeliever class does come close to satisfying
the third standard in that nonbelievers probably do not comprise so
large a segment of the population that the representative nature of a
cross section of the community would be impaired.1 0 Yet, because
the Labat court approved the Madison result, it is arguable that
the cross section desired is one which approaches the maximum repre-
sentation of community opinion in all areas; or, alternatively, that
regardless of the fact that the exclusion does not patently disrupt the
representative character of the venire, it is nonetheless invalid since
it is unrelated to juror competency and excludes from the cross
section some community members for whose exclusion there is no
reasonable necessity. It appears, however, that these alternative
analyses of the court's position may be reconciled by the formulation
that the cross section must be at least broad enough to encompass
all those individuals for whose exclusion there is no justification un-
der the competency and public need standards. Therefore, any
category one exclusion would seem to be invalid by definition.
Categories two and three contain those exclusions which are not
08240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965); see note 80 infra.
69 365 F.2d at 724; see note 80 infra.
70 Figures available from the Bureau of the Census indicate that of the sample
studied, less than three per cent of those individuals fourteen years of age or older
professed no religion. U.S. DEs"T 6F COMMERCE, STATSTICAL A.sTRAar 40 (1965).
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justifiable on grounds of competence, but are related to public need,
and which differ only in that category two involves an exclusion
which would severely affect the cross section obtained. The result
in these two instances is somewhat unclear, as there may be a curious
interaction between the requisites of the cross section and those of
the public need. If, for example, doctors were the excluded cate-
gory and they formed a significant portion of the cross section in
category two, then presumably they are plentiful in the community,
and the public need for their exclusion is vitiated insofar as this
rationale is based on the notion that there are usually insufficient
doctors to treat the sick. Therefore, this exclusion would be invalid.
However, in category three, the exclusion would seem far more
justifiable, since the fact that the impairment of the cross section is
only minimal operates to reinforce the importance of the public need,
since that need is magnified when few doctors are available.
Category four would encompass an exclusion which bears a rela-
tionship to competence, for which there is no public necessity, and
which impairs the cross section. An example might be the exclusion
of those without a high school education in a community where the
general educational level is low. This circumstance brings sharply
into focus the question of establishing a minimum level of compe-
tence which would maximize the cross section obtained consistent
with the defendant's right to a competent tribunal. As noted above, 71
the Fifth Circuit's tendency would be to resolve any apparent con-
flict in favor of the cross section.
A similar examination of category five indicates that it differs
from four only in that the cross section would not be severely im-
paired by the education requirement. This situation could occur in
a community with a high educational level. While it is true that
the cross section is only minimally affected, the Labat court's em-
phasis upon the cross section requirements, as opposed to competency
criteria, would raise a question as to the validity of such an exclusion.
Category six would involve an exclusion which is justifiable in
terms of competence and public need but which severely affects the
cross section obtainable. Few exclusions will fall into this category
because of the unlikelihood that the members of a particular group
71 See notes 62, 66 supra and accompanying text.
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would be simultaneously incompetent for jury service and justifiably
excused in terms of the public need. Any exclusions which do fall
in category six, however, should be sustained regardless of their
effect on the cross section, as the concurrence of the competency and
public need factors should save the selection scheme.
While an examination of the permutations possible within the
court's triple test serves to illustrate how the three standards might
interact in given situations, it seems improper that the state should be
forbidden to delineate reasonable standards for juror competency,
regardless of the resulting effect on the cross section of a particular
community.72 The public need and general level of individual
competency will vary from community to community, but this
factor should have no effect on a defendant's right to be tried by a
competent tribunal. If the right to jury trial is to be meaningful,
the jury must include those members of the community who can
understand the issues, weigh the evidence, follow their instruc-
tions, engage in orderly debate, and return with a considered verdict.
A certain level of intellectual attainment is necessary to perform
these functions, and defendants, and the state as well, have a crucial
interest in having their arguments heard by an impartial and com-
petent tribunal. To apply these principles to the mechanics of the
triple test, once a reasonable level of competence has been decided
upon, it should not be varied simply because it appears that in a
given community the cross section is impaired. Neither, for that
matter, should the competence criterion be altered merely because its
result in some communities is to eliminate a large number of Negroes,
although the Labat court in its alternative holding3 indicates that
a standard which excludes a disproportionate number of Negroes is
automatically suspect.74
If competence were clearly defined and if all those who did not
meet that standard could be excluded with no further consideration,
72 Nevertheless, although the Fifth Circuit has made no definite pronouncement on
what general level of competency should be maintained, its reference to a fourth grade
literacy level indicates that the court may be willing to accept a relatively low com-
petency standard in order to maximize the cross section. See note 62 supra,
73 See text accompanying note 54 supra.
7
, See 365 F.2d at 724-25. To the extent that the number of Negroes excluded in
some communities will doubtless vary almost exponentially with the years of schooling
required, the court's preoccupation with a broad community cross section suggests that
the competency requirement must be cut back to avoid excluding them. This is a
democratic standard, but a regrettably fatuous one, as the Supreme Court itself has
implied. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 291 (1947).
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then categories four through six, concerning exclusions related to
competence, would be presumptively valid, regardless of the relation-
ship of the exclusion to the cross section and public need criteria.
Reasoning from the court's approval of the Madison case, category
one would seem to be invalid.75 The area of doubt as to the effect
of the triple test on state exclusions would thus be limited to those
exclusions in categories two and three which involve the balancing
of the community's interest in the uninterrupted work of those who
provide its essential services against the right of the defendant to a
cross section of maximum breadth.
So to insist on the sanctity of competency requirements reduces
the triple test to that which has always been applied in jury selec-
tion cases, namely, the community's needs balanced against the de-
fendant's right to a representative cross section.7" Nevertheless, the
Labat test is meaningful in light of the effective rejection of the
requirement that actual prejudice must be proved in order to contest
jury composition. In this connection, the majority opinion asserted
that
the undermining of the jury system's fact finding process, the
opportunity for unfairness, the risk that defendants who may be
daily wage earners will be prejudiced by exclusion of jurors in the
same class are dangers which would compel condemnation of the
practice without the necessity of the court's finding actual prejudice
affecting the outcome of the case. 77
By speaking in terms evocative of the "same class" rule,78 the court
may mean simply that it is extending the benefits of that rule to a
class not traditionally subject to bias and oppression. On the other
hand, the court's assertion that "the very integrity of the fact-finding
process" is jeopardized by the wage earner exclusion," plus the state-
ment that the opportunity for unfairness and partiality should
properly be the subject of constitutional objection, compel the con-
clusion that absolute abandonment of the prejudice principle was
intended.8 0 Thus, every defendant is constitutionally entitled to a
jury drawn in accordance with the triple test.
75 See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
70 See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
77 365 F.2d at 723. (Emphasis added.)
7S See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text.
79 365 F.2d at 723 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965)).
"o It is instructive that the court approvingly quoted from Allen v. State, 110 Ga.
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In holding that standing is not dependent upon a showing of
prejudice, the Fifth Circuit has done what the Supreme Court has
declined to do."' Therefore, the basic question is whether the op-
portunity for undetectable or objectively unprovable prejudice,
against which the triple test ultimately guards, is sufficiently great to
warrant overriding the posited reasons for the Court's reluctance to
adopt any such test in the past. 2 Arguably, a state's interest in main-
taining a particular approach to jury selection is not so overriding a
concern as to justify the continuation of practices which could con-
ceivably prejudice a defendant. Yet one concern of unquestioned
importance to a state is that of achieving finality in litigation. The
major difficulty with the triple test is that the test, coupled with the
defendant's opportunity to make out prima facie case by showing
only objective results, would make the state's burden-of rebuttal
difficulty to carry because the standards imposed by the triple test are
as yet largely undefined.8 3 Furthermore, despite the Labat court's
App. 56, 59-60, 137 S.E.2d 711, 715-17 (1964), a passage wherein the Georgia court,
holding that a white civil rights worker had standing to challenge the exclusion of
Negroes,-stated that a jury not representative of the community is a denial of due
process to every defendant. 365 F.2d at 723. See generally Note, 43 N.C.L. REV. 404
(1965); 78 HARv. L. Ezv. 667 (1965). The Fifth Circuit also relied heavily upon State
v. Madison, 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965) (see notes 68-69 supra and accompanying
text), a case in which the Allen rejection of the "'same class" rule was recognized
and extended. In Madison, a member of the ApostOlic faith, himself a believer in
God, was granted standing to challenge the exclusion of non-believers from his jury.
The Madison court attempted to underplay its departure from the traditional "same
class" doctrine by noting that the Maryland exclusion was statutory rather than adminis-
trative and that the "same class" rule has been utilized only with respect to the latter
category. 240 Md. at 268 n.1, 213 A.2d at 882-n.l. However, because the Madison court
held that the exclusions violated Madison's due process and equal protection rights,
the fact that the exclusion was accomplished statutorily and not administratively would
seem to be irrelevant. Thus Madison is left among the forefront of state court cases
requiring a broadened concept of the "cross section of the community," under which
the prejudice principle is abandoned and the litigant is given standing even though he
is not a member of, nor closely identified with, the excluded class. The Labat court's
citations of Allen and Madison strongly indicate that the Fifth Circuit intends to
abandon the "same class" rule, to the extent that it required a particularized demon-
stration of prejudice on the part of one who is not of the same class as the excluded
jurors in order to have standing to attack the exclusion.81 See note 31 supra.
82 See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
88 See text preceding note 61 supra. In addition to the fact that only indefinite
standards were laid down by Labat, the extent to which application of the triple
test would burden state jury selection systems is indicated by the present widespread
existence of state statutes creating exemptions of dubious validity in terms of the
public interest rationale. Examples are the exclusions of women, licensed veterinarians
and embalmers. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-104 (1962). Many states exempt occupational
classes for whose exclusion there would seem to be no present justification, e.g.,
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announced abandonment of the prejudice principle, if the prob-
ability of prejudice is minimal, it would be fatuous to reverse con-
victims which were to all appearances fairly and impartially ren-
dered.84 Thus, it would seem unwise for the Supreme Court to adopt
the rule in the absence of further judicial amplification of the terms
"competence," "public need," and "cross section."
Finally, as the racial issue inevitably clouds the holding in Labat,
the case was a poor vehicle for the explication of non-racial jury ex-
clusion standards. Consequently the court should have followed the
approach traditionally utilized to remedy instances of racial dis-
crimination,85 saving consideration of the issue of economic ex-
clusions for a case in which that issue was more clearly presented.
keepers of ferries or tollgates, express agents, and mail carriers, CAL. Cxv. PROC. CODE
§ 200; the president and cashier of any state or national bank, "one miller to each
gristmill; one head sawyer and engineer in each steam sawmill and shingle mill; one
foreman and engineer in each factor and machine shop." Wis. STAT. § 255.02 (1965).
8' The desire to assure the reliability of the guilt determining process is the under-
lying reason that convictions are reversed when obtained in the absence of constitu-
tionally required procedures. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process
Adjudication, 66 YAm L.J. 319, 346 (1957). It would therefore seem inappropriate to
apply the remedy of reversal in the absence of some actual doubt as to the impartiality
and thus the reliability of a verdict. Thus, retention of the condition that actual
prejudice be demonstrated in order to obtain reversal of a conviction has been em-
phasized by various judges. E.g., Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 229 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); State v. Madison, 240 Md. 265, 277, 213 A.2d 880, 887-88
(1965) (dissenting opinion). However, the prejudice principle has been severely criti-
cized to the extent that it requires an inquiry into actual and not merely possible
prejudice. E.g., Note, 52 VA. L. REv. 1069, 1122 (1966); Note, 75 YALE L.J. 322 (1965);
78 HARv. L. REv. 667 (1965).
" See note 56 supra.
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